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Abstract 
Ludin’s Kopftuch (headdress): A problem of religious freedom in German 
schools 
Fereshta Ludin is a German citizen and devout “Muslimin”. She has 
been denied leave to wear her “Kopftuch” in the classroom. She has 
lost her case in the courtrooms of the states where appeals were 
lodged to lift the ban. She may consequently not teach at any public 
school in Germany. We argue that Ludin is entitled to wear the 
“Kopftuch” on grounds of her right to religious freedom and that the 
attempt to deny her this entitlement constitutes a breach of individual 
rights. Following the South African philosopher, Denise Meyerson, we 
maintain that the domain of religion constitutes an area of intractable 
dispute, and that the state is not entitled to limit liberty in this domain 
because it cannot justify limitations in a neutrally acceptable way. 
Meyerson’s arguments rest on the acceptability of Rawls’s notion of 
public reason. We test Ludin’s case against Jeremy Waldron’s 
objections to the use of deliberative discipline of public reason in 
cultural disputes and against his alternative to the politics of identity. 
Meyerson’s approach offers protection of religious dissent in a way 
Waldron’s cannot. One significant reason for this is Waldron’s insist-
ence on the elimination of identity claims from the conversation 
between cultures seeking accommodation with one another in the 
liberal pluralist state. However, bracketing identity claims eliminates 
what is peculiar about Ludin’s case. This we bring out by drawing on 
views of Sawitri Sahorsa and Melissa Williams. We argue that Ludin’s 
dilemma is twofold: her status as “metic” – as a member of a minority 
at the margins of mainstream German culture, and her status as 
“Muslimin” – as one believed to be suffering sexual discrimination in 
her own culture, hang together in a way that challenges the integration 
policies of the German state and embarrasses German feminism.   
Ludin’s “Kopftuch” (headdress): A problem of religious freedom in German schools  
278 Koers 69(2) 2004:277-315 
Opsomming 
Ludin se kopdoek: die probleem van godsdiensvryheid in Duitsland 
Fereshta Ludin, ’n onderwyseres, is ’n Duitse burger en ’n toegewyde 
Moslemvrou. Sy is toestemming geweier om haar kopdoek in die 
klaskamer te mag dra. Sy het haar saak om die verbod op te hef, 
verloor in die howe van die Duitse state waar sy appél aangeteken 
het. Sy mag gevolglik nie aan enige staatskool in Duitsland onderrig 
gee nie. Ons voer in dié artikel aan dat Ludin daarop geregtig is om 
haar kopdoek te dra op grond van haar reg op godsdiensvryheid en 
dat die poging om haar dit te verbied, afbreuk doen aan haar 
individuele regte. In navolging van die Suid-Afrikaanse filosoof, Denise 
Meyerson, voer ons aan dat die gebied van godsdiens ’n gebied van 
weerspannige (onoplosbare) dispuut behels, en dat die staat nie 
daarop geregtig is om vryheid op hierdie gebied te beperk nie, omdat 
die staat nie beperkings op ’n neutraal aanvaarbare wyse kan reg-
verdig nie. Meyerson se argumente berus op die aanvaarbaarheid van 
Rawls se idee van openbare rede (“public reason”). Ons toets Ludin 
se geval ook aan Jeremy Waldron se besware teen die gebruik van 
die doelbewuste dissipline van openbare rede in kulturele dispute, 
asook aan Waldron se alternatief tot die politiek van identiteit. 
Meyerson se benadering beskerm godsdienstige andersdenkendes op 
’n wyse wat Waldron se benadering nie kan doen nie. Een belangrike 
rede hiervoor is Waldron se klem op die uitskakeling van identiteits-
aansprake uit die gesprek tussen kulture wat poog om met mekaar 
saam te leef in ’n liberale plurale staat. Om die identiteitsaansprake 
tussen hakies te plaas elimineer egter die besondere kenmerke van 
Ludin se geval. Ons benadruk dit met die hulp van idees van Sawitri 
Sahorsa en Melissa Williams. Ons voer aan dat Ludin se dilemma 
tweevoudig is. Haar status as metoikos (“metic”) – lid van ’n gema-
ginaliseerde minderheidsgroep in die Duitse kultuur – en haar status 
as Moslemvrou – iemand van wie geglo word dat sy aan seksuele dis-
kriminasie in haar eie kultuur onderwerp word - hang saam op ’n wyse 
wat die integrasiebeleid van die Duitse staat uitdaag, en ’n ver-
leentheid is vir Duitse feministe.  
1. Overview 
Fereshta Ludin, a Muslimin teaching at a German public school, was 
reprimanded for wearing her headdress to school; she was accused 
of making a religious statement; she was (so to speak) silently 
professing her religion in what ought to be an a-religious context. 
She, however, refused to remove her Kopftuch. Eventually, after a 
lengthy legal struggle, the high court (Karlsruhe) overruled her and 
she was discharged – we think wrongly so. This is only one of many 
similar cases. We focus on Ludin’s case because it is the most 
widely publicised case in Germany and the European Union. 
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Ludin’s dilemma demonstrates something many people suspected. 
The liberal state in Germany faces two crises, one over an issue of 
religious freedom and another over the access of minorities to the 
public realm. As a liberal state Germany shares with other states of 
the European Union a commitment both to the equal moral worth of 
persons and to the tolerance of diverse points of view on how lives 
should be lived. The issue before the German state concerns the 
problem of how diverse religious views (Protestant and Catholic 
Christianity as well as Islam) can co-exist in one state without 
compromising the equality constraints of liberalism. Tolerance for 
competing versions of what a good life entails distinguishes liberals 
from fundamentalists (both Christian and Islamic). The states in 
Germany attempt to cope with the pressures generated by the 
demands of tolerance by defending a policy of state neutrality, which 
they interpret as requiring that public agents bear no religious 
symbols, as an addition to the standard interpretation. Dworkin 
(1990:13) describes the standard position thus:  
Liberalism commands tolerance; it commands, for example, that 
political decisions about what citizens should be forced to do or 
prevented from doing must be made on grounds that are neutral 
among the competing convictions about good and bad lives that 
different members of the community might hold.  
The state has no business resolving the competition or favouring 
one conviction over another. It can, at any rate, not do so without 
taking sides, thereby ignoring the requirements of both equality and 
tolerance. But tolerance has limits. There are things the state should 
not tolerate, for example, sexual discrimination which makes women 
unequal partners in marriage and unequal participants in the 
public/political realm of the state. Liberalism’s commitment to the 
idea of equality rules sexual discrimination (as well as racial and 
cultural discrimination) out of court. We maintain that the state 
should not tolerate any illiberal consensus among its minorities 
because they falsely deny the equal moral worth of persons, and as 
such they are unreasonable comprehensive ethical doctrines. Rawls 
(1993:60-61) puts the matter as follows:  
Reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political 
power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views 
that are not unreasonable, though different from their own. This is 
because, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, a public and 
shared basis of justification that applies to comprehensive 
doctrines is lacking in the public culture of a democratic society.  
Muslim minorities in Germany, however, do practise sexual dis-
crimination and so qualify as illiberal minorities. But the states in 
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Germany are themselves not consistently liberal. They frequently 
practise forms of cultural discrimination, which often enough look 
like racial discrimination. The most important indications of this 
tendency comes from popular representations in the media of the 
Other as raced, ethnic (in dress and custom), and non-Christian, 
from the public statements of elected state representatives 
(particularly in the Catholic-governed Christlich Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-Soziale Union states), and from a general and 
prevalent Ausländerfeindlichkeit among conservative sectors of the 
population. These factors render Ludin’s struggle over her Kopftuch 
very problematical, making it at once an issue of religious and 
political freedom. 
The fate of Muslim minorities in Europe are tied up with the history 
of guest worker policies of the states of the European Union. Guest 
workers initially were regarded as long-term residents without claims 
to citizenship. This understanding of their status has changed slowly 
over the years, but these groups still exist at the margins of society 
without a real prospect of being admitted as equal members of the 
European Community. The American philosopher, Michael Walzer 
(1983), calls these people “metics” (cited in Kymlicka & Norman, 
2000:21). Ludin’s current position, in spite of the fact that she is a 
citizen, is that of a historical “metic”. She is what we shall call a 
“metic-Muslimin”, one who stands at the margins of mainstream 
culture without the normal rights of participation in the public realm, 
and one who suffers, or who is believed to be suffering, paternalistic 
sexual discrimination in her own culture. This double yoke is the key 
to understanding Ludin’s problem. 
Ten years ago the South African philosopher, Denise Meyerson, 
published a book – Rights Limited (1994) – in which she defends a 
limitation clause in the South African constitution. The clause lays 
down the conditions under which a right protected by the constitution 
may permissibly be limited. Religious freedom is such a right. For 
such a right to be limited, the justification of the limitation must be 
compatible with the democratic values of dignity, equality and 
freedom (Meyerson, 1994:4). Meyerson’s approach, which runs on 
her use of Rawls’s notion of public reason, offers protection of both 
religious and moral dissenters. This limitation clause is not available 
to German legislators, but we see no harm in testing the controversy 
over the Kopftuch against the values it contains, for they are demo-
cratic values shared by many European states including Germany.    
In section 2 we present our interpretation of the controversy over the 
Kopftuch. In section 3 we argue, following Denise Meyerson, that 
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since the domain of religion constitutes an area of intractable dis-
pute, and since the state cannot justify any limitation of religious 
freedom in a neutrally acceptable way, it has no business interfering 
in this realm. In section 4 we take issue with Jeremy Waldron’s 
objections to the use of the deliberative discipline of public reason 
and with his objections to the employment of the politics of identity in 
multicultural disputes. We argue that Waldron’s alternatives do not 
help Ludin. In section 5 we examine the failure to understand 
Ludin’s case in the light of an alternative theory presented by 
Melissa Williams. Williams’s “sensitivity-to-reasons” approach also 
gets a grip on Ludin’s case. In section 5 we also take up the failure 
of feminists in Germany to defend Ludin. In section 6 we draw a few 
lines together and discuss conditions which must be fulfilled for a 
programme of religious and cultural integration to succeed.  
2. Interpretation of the controversy 
2.1 The first opposing position: the stance of strict neutrality  
In this section we interpret the controversy concerning the display of 
religious symbols by teachers in public schools, by outlining and 
discussing two positions in support of a ban, i.e. two positions in 
opposition to the position we want to defend. There are two 
positions which derive from the freedom the states in Germany have 
to legislate on matters of education. We shall employ the phrase 
“the state” to mean the elected governments in the numerous 
Länder and not the central government. At present there is no 
uniform policy on the problem of religious symbols and no central 
policy.  
• State neutrality 
Agents in their public roles may bear no religious symbols. This is 
part of the state’s policy of neutrality with respect to religion. The 
state does not interfere in matters relating to the private/social 
domain except to prevent interference by one agent or group in the 
religious life of any other agent or group. This is its proper function. 
Indeed it has become known in literature (for instance Bird, 1999: 
186) as “the service conception of agency” – the state services, 
rights to liberty thereby creating conditions appropriate to the 
flourishing of liberty.  
• Bearers of religious symbols infringe the Harm principle 
The critical claims are that agents in their public roles are 
representatives of the state, and that public agents who display 
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religious symbols harm the public interest by exerting religious 
influence in certain non-permissible ways. Specifically, the Kopftuch 
is a symbol of fundamentalist suppression of women; it has an 
appelativen Charakter, a certain Glaubensinhalt (Müller, 2003a, 
reporting on the Karlsruhe judgement) which carries with it a certain 
worldview, one that damages the equality constraints governing 
relations between the sexes1 – (“With this a worldview is put across 
which probably does not enhance equality between the sexes very 
much”) (Editorial staff, 2003, quoting Rechtsprofessor Ferdinand 
Kirchhof). This is the heart of the state’s claim that Ludin’s Kopftuch 
is a symbol of political dissent masquerading as religious dissent. 
(We return to the charge of political dissent towards the end of this 
article.) 
By appearing before impressionable children the bearer creates the 
misleading impression that the state sanctions this fundamentalist 
suppression as part of its public morality. Additionally, the bearer of 
the Kopftuch harms the religious freedom of her pupils (seemingly) 
by exerting influence on their religious orientation, which influence 
arises from (unconscious) desires to emulate the person of the 
bearer. The Kopftuch, additionally, may be a cause of religious 
unrest in the schools. Ludin would be bringing religious conflict from 
outside into the school – “Konflikte von aussen in die Schule 
hineintragen” (Editorial staff, 2003, quoting Kiel psychologist 
Thomas Bliesener). 
In all cases in which the Harm principle is infringed, the neutrality 
obligations of teachers and other public agents take precedence 
over their religious freedom. In effect, the right not to be harmed is in 
these cases always prior, even when Ludin’s right to equality of 
access and opportunity is affected in the form of a Berufsverbot 
(occupational prohibition). According to the Harm principle, someone 
is harmed when she has been rendered unable, by coercion, 
manipulation or any other means, to exercise choice in some central 
part of her life. One important qualification, however, obtains: The 
constitution does not contain a limitation clause which limits religious 
freedom.2 (“Freedom of belief, of conscience and the freedom of 
confession with respect to religious and worldview confessions, are 
                                           
1 “Damit werde eine Weltanschauung transportiert, die sicher nicht sehr die 
Gleichberechtigung fördert”. 
2 “Die Freiheit des Glaubens, des Gewissens und die Freiheit des religiösen und 
weltanschaulichen Bekenntnisses sind unverletzlich”. 
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inviolable”) (Müller, 2003b, quoting the Constitution). But this does 
not exclude pragmatic tampering with religious freedom. “As distinct 
from other basic rights, there is no basis in the law that enables the 
state to limit religious freedom. The freedom of religion finds its limits 
only in comparable values which are named in the law”3) (Müller, 
2003b, reporting on the decision of the Zweite Senat des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts). The Harm principle is the one important 
justificatory consideration, though the limitations it prescribes are 
subject to considerations of equality. 
• Equal limitation of the freedom of religion 
Liberty is legitimately restricted when the restrictions apply to all 
moral agents irrespective of their religious orientation. An equal 
limitation of liberty is justified when it issues in greater liberty. An 
equal limitation is further justified when it satisfies the Harm principle 
(i.e. it prevents harms to individuals, such as a loss of liberty due to 
interference by other agents). This is the standard defence of 
limitations on liberty. No person may be disadvantaged in respect of 
her liberty because of her religious beliefs. But the public interest 
warrants a limited suppression of the freedom of religion on grounds 
that the Kopftuch is a vicious symbol of the kind indicated. The 
limited loss of religious freedom for one group or religion is then 
justified when other groups or religions are equally affected by the 
limitation. If the Kopftuch is not permitted, then also no crucifix. 
Neutrality, then, protects the freedoms of all groups or religions. The 
need to equalise the effect of the limitation, limits freedom for 
everyone. 
The position may schematically be presented thus: 
• Religious freedom is sacrosanct and non-overriddable except in 
cases where the Harm principle is infringed. 
• A limitation of religious freedom is legitimate only when the 
limitation is borne equally by all in the interests of greater free-
dom for all. 
• The Kopftuch causes harm in the sense required by the Harm 
principle. 
                                           
3 “Anders als bei anderen Grundrechten fehlt es an einem Gesetzvorbehalt, der 
dem Gesetzgeber Einschränkungen ermöglicht. Die Religionsfreiheit findet ihre 
Grenzen demnach nur in anderen Werten von Verfassungsrang”. 
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• Forbidding it for public agents who are representatives of state is 
legitimate, provided that all other religious symbols are also 
forbidden for the agents concerned. 
• The legitimate order is one of neutrality. Ludin offends against 
this order by wearing the Kopftuch, and she must then bear 
responsibility herself for the fact that she does not have equal 
access to opportunity and position (Berufsverbot).  
2.2 The second opposing position: the prior importance of 
the established Christian communities 
The state is neutral (in the same sense as the first opposing 
position), but may limit the religious freedom of alien religions in 
order to protect the religious freedom of the established Christian 
communities. Christian symbols are permitted in public schools, but 
must be removed in the event of complaint. (Nuns are permitted to 
teach wearing the Habit.) The Muslim symbols (particularly the 
Kopftuch) are explicitly forbidden. (“We cannot put the clothing of 
our mature Christian culture on equal footing with the insignia of 
provocative, fundamentalistic, alien cultures”4) (quoting Kultusminis-
ter Hans Zehetmair; see Anon. (2003)). 
The above position may schematically be represented thus: 
• Religious freedom is sacrosanct and non-overiddable except in 
cases where the Harm principle is infringed. 
• The state must maintain neutrality except when it must act to 
prevent harm to the established Christian character of the 
community.  
• The Kopftuch causes harm in the sense required by the Harm 
principle. 
• Forbidding it for public agents who are representatives of state is 
legitimate on grounds that the (greater) freedom of the Christian 
communities are under threat.   
The Christian order is the established order. Ludin’s Kopftuch harms 
this order. She herself must then bear responsibility for the con-
                                           
4 “Wir können doch die Kleidung unserer gewachsenen christlichen Kultur nicht 
gleichstellen mit den Insignien provokanter, fundamentalistischer fremder 
Kulturen” (Anon., 2003). 
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sequence that she does not have equal access to opportunity and 
position (Berufsverbot). 
3. In defence of the Kopftuch 
3.1 Distinguishing kinds of harms 
We shall argue below that the Kopftuch is a harm of a certain kind, 
but not a harm in the sense required by the Harm principle. The 
appropriate sense invokes the idea that someone is harmed when 
she has been rendered unable, by coercion, manipulation or any 
other means, to exercise choice in some central part of her life.  
The opposing positions invoke the Harm principle. Ludin’s freedom 
to practise and to manifest her religion, it is argued, harms others in 
various ways, and this harm is allegedly sufficient justification to 
limit, not the practice but rather the manifest of her religion, and only 
in her public roles. This viewpoint appears to constitute a limited 
intrusion, yet from the perspective of her belief it may be much more 
extensive. How much limitation on manifest might practice sustain? 
Ludin’s public utterances, as reported by her lawyers, suggest that 
the limitation on manifest, albeit only in her role as representative of 
state, effectively undercuts practice. Indeed, the harm to her position 
is harm to religious conscience. (“The headdress is a part of her 
personality and a part of her religious practice as Muslim woman”5) 
(Editorial staff, 2001, citing Ludin). (“Ludin’s lawyer, Hansjörg 
Melchinger, emphasised that his client would experience the 
removal of her headdress as stripping and that she would be 
ashamed”6) (Editorial staff, 2003, quoting Ludin’s lawyer Hansjörg 
Melchinger). 
3.2 Neutral and non-neutral harms 
Following Meyerson (1994:1-43) we distinguish between neutral and 
non-neutral harms. A non-neutral harm is one that emerges from an 
“intractably disputed belief” (Meyerson, 1994:16 ff.), a belief that 
cannot be judged by the canons of ordinary public reason and has 
no chance of being accepted “by all reasonable people” (Meyerson, 
1994:10). Religious beliefs are intractable in this sense. The belief 
                                           
5 “Das Kopftuch sei Teil ihrer Persönlichkeit und teil ihrer Glaubenspraxis als 
Muslimin.” 
6 “Ludins Anwalt Hansjörg Melchinger betonte, seine Mandantin würde das 
Ablegen des Kopftuches als Entblößung empfinden und sich schämen.” 
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that a woman is naked before the world without her Kopftuch, and in 
a condition of immorality offensive to the Prophet, is exactly of this 
kind. The belief and its manifest count as a non-neutral harm. We 
use the terminology of harm here to underline the idea that a 
“majority can be harmed by protected religious activity” (Meyerson, 
1994:23). The state, however, has no business preventing these 
harms from occurring because the state cannot justify intervention 
by public reason. 
Neutral harms are independent of intractably disputed beliefs and 
must be prevented by state action. Paternalism of the kind involving 
the suppression of women in society, specifically the kind that 
relegates women to positions of inequality with respect to men, 
whether backed by religious sanction or not, is a neutral harm, one 
that all people situated as equals would reasonably accord some 
degree of assent irrespective of their own particular intractable 
beliefs. Neutral harms have a pernicious character. They strike at 
the very root of the society disturbing the terms of social co-
operation which the citizens have agreed to abide by. In essence, 
neutral harms are coercions; they coercively negate rights.  
The defence of the neutral/non-neutral distinction reaches deeply 
into the heart of egalitarianism and libertarianism. Meyerson (1994:1 
ff.) notes that the South African Constitution contains a limitation 
clause which deals with the state’s right to limit religious freedom in 
certain kinds of cases. The state is justified in limiting religious 
freedom when it is able to supply “public reasons” (Meyerson, 
1994:15), reasons which “respect the values of dignity, equality and 
freedom” (Meyerson, 1994:4) and so would be reasons which “all 
reasonable people would, if asked, accord some degree of force” 
(Meyerson, 1994:12). The requirement that the state’s reasons 
respect our dignity is a measure protecting moral agents from being 
used as instruments of the state’s power. If the reasons do not carry 
weight with all reasonable people, the state may rightfully be 
accused of treating its citizens as a mere means to its ends (in the 
Kantian sense), thus failing to respect their dignity (Meyerson, 
1994:13). If the reasons do not carry weight with all reasonable 
people, the state might rightfully be accused of advancing the 
interests of some at the expense of the interests of others, and thus 
as failing to treat its citizens equally, which is a failure to respect “the 
inherent moral status” (in the Kantian and Lockean senses) (Meyer-
son, 1994:14) of some of them. The idea that humans have inherent 
moral status is meant to counterbalance Hobbesian interpretations 
of the terms of co-operation between reasonable persons under 
which it is rational for essentially self-interested persons to co-
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operate with others for mutual advantage. The problem with Hobbes 
is that the terms of co-operation are in effect structured by the 
balance of power between the strong and the weak (Meyerson, 
1994:12), which means that the strong “stand to lose, not gain, from 
justice” (Meyerson, 1994:13). The strong, then, are unfairly burden-
ed with respect to the compliance constraints of justice. Finally, the 
inclusion of the word “freedom” in the limitation clause brings out the 
idea that without respect for dignity and equality, no one can be said 
to be truly free, not even in the purely negative sense in which we 
are said to be free if we are free of interference by others. 
If any agent discounts the dignity of any other moral agent, or fail to 
treat her as having inherent moral status, her freedom is harmed. 
This counts as a neutral harm, because the harm is a negation of 
choice in a central part of someone’s life. The state, in its role as 
servicer of rights, has a duty to protect its citizens against neutral 
harms, and may, of course, itself not inflict such harms on its 
citizens. Non-neutral harms do not denigrate the status of any agent 
in any way. Non-neutral harms can and do cause offence, but 
offence is rarely a neutral harm. Meyerson (1994:24-26) explains as 
follows: When people are offended by an intractable belief, or its 
manifest, they have not suffered a neutral harm; they have not been 
rendered unable to exercise choice in any central part of their lives, 
and so there is no legitimate reason to limit (religious) freedom, 
which means that there is no public reason to suppress the 
Kopftuch. But offence can be construed as neutrally harming when 
the offender intrudes on someone’s privacy, when, say, the Kopftuch 
“is imposed on them in circumstances which they cannot reasonably 
avoid” (Meyerson, 1994:25). If an invasion of privacy is the ob-
jection, then neutral harm occurs, though not of the damaging kind 
associated with these harms.  
But what should we say about the objection that the Kopftuch is a 
vicious symbol of the suppression of women? Does the bearer inflict 
a harm of this dimension on others? If true (and allowing for the 
moment that it might be true), such harm would count as a neutral 
harm requiring urgent state action; a retreat to neutrality (in the 
questionable sense offered by the state) would not be sufficient 
protection. Indeed, the state would have to suppress not just the 
Kopftuch but also the Glaubensinhalt which accompanies it. And 
that would require decisive interference in the private/social domain, 
and specifically in schools, to promote a (strongly prescriptive) 
ethical value about the wrongfulness of gender discrimination. The 
state would then be taking an ethical stance, which goes beyond its 
neutral role as servicer of rights, and making judgements about the 
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(intrinsic) worth of competing religions. State judgements of that 
kind, carrying with it the stature of legislation, easily converts the 
non-neutral harm of offence into the bogey neutral harm of gender 
inequality. Decisive state interference, however, would not escape a 
deep irony: the wrongfulness of gender discrimination is a strong 
value in German culture to which appeal can be made without 
trespassing on sacrosanct religious freedoms (a point we owe to 
Meyerson 1994:23) thereby raising thorny issues about the over-
riddabilty of individual rights when in conflict with common goals or 
purposes. The possibility of such an appeal is a good reason not to 
limit religious freedom. Why, then, does the state choose to limit 
freedom?  
3.3 Paternalism and voluntariness 
One likely answer concerns the problem of paternalism correctly 
perceived to be prevalent in minority Islamic cultures. The state 
judges, so we surmise, that paternalism is the real threat. So we 
must ask how strongly paternalistic is the Kopftuch? Ludin’s en-
dorsement of the Kopftuch and its Glaubensinhalte is a fully 
voluntary choice (as confirmed by her lawyers). Fully voluntary 
choices are those that conform to Feinberg’s “ideal of perfectly 
voluntary choices” (Feinberg cited in Arneson, 1989:424). Ideally the 
chooser should be competent. Her choice should be made in 
absence of coercion or duress, not because of (subtle) manipulation, 
not because of ignorance or mistaken beliefs about the circum-
stances in which she acts or the likely consequences of the various 
alternatives open to her, and should not be made in circumstances 
that are temporarily distorting. Let us call this, following Dworkin 
(1990:50), the “endorsement constraint”. Dworkin (1990:50), citing 
Locke (1991), requires an affirmation of the “endorsement con-
straint”. “A person’s endorsement of a conception of the good is 
necessary for it to be a good for her” (Kernohan, 1998:30). But 
endorsement, in Dworkin’s sense, is only necessary for the 
ascription of value; it does not entail that decisions are incorrigible. 
An agent may still be mistaken in the sense in which Sisyphus was 
mistaken. To avoid this Dworkin (1989:486) requires the “authen-
ticity constraint”, which, in addition to making the agent authorative 
over her conception of the good, also guards against deception, so 
that her endorsement is truly constitutive of who she believes herself 
to be, after due consideration of the merit of the good in a critical, 
reflective way (Dworkin, 1989:486). The authenticity constraint 
presupposes, as Kernohan (1998:33) makes clear, a “knowledge 
constraint”: Her “highest-order interest is in coming to know what is 
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best for her and then being able to implement it”. In an important 
sense, knowing what is best for her is having true beliefs about her 
good – beliefs she can justify to others (Kernohan, 1998:34-35). The 
sense at issue concerns the need for revisability: Her good must be 
revisable in the sense of being responsive to justifying reasons. To 
protect her from harm to her highest-order interest in leading the 
best life possible, we have to protect her highest-order interest in 
knowing what is best for her (Kernohan, 1998:36). 
Does Ludin have true beliefs about her good? Ludin has identified 
her good with her religious faith, in terms of her status as Muslimin 
and the Glaubensinhalte of the worldview associated with it. Yet, it 
may be objected, she may have false beliefs about her good. She 
may be the victim of cultural oppression of the kind women in the 
Western democracies associated with religious fundamentalism. 
Cultural oppression is a form of power (Kernohan, 1998:14). Kerno-
han (1998:15), quoting Galbraith (1983:25-26), sees the problem in 
the concept of implicit conditioned power.  
Only a part of the subordination of women was achieved by explicit 
instruction – explicit conditioning. Much and almost certainly more 
was (and is) achieved by the simple acceptance of what the 
community and culture have long thought right and virtuous … 
This is implicit conditioning, a powerful force.  
Young (1992:180) calls the implicit conditioning power of a culture 
“structural or systemic” oppression which Kernohan (1998:17) 
compares to Foucault’s (1982:781) notion of “a form of power which 
makes individual subjects”. Foucault recognises “two meanings of 
the word ‘subject’: Subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to”. Kernohan, like Galbraith and 
Young, is concerned with the latter. In the relevant Foucauldian 
sense tying people “to the conception of the good which form their 
own identities ... subjects ... them to their culture” (Kernohan, 1998: 
17). Subjugation in this sense, however, is not harmful. Subjugation 
is harmful if, for any individual, it interferes with “the very process of 
forming a conception of the good” (Kernohan, 1998:26), in knowing 
her good or in implementing her conception of the good. This would 
be a neutral harm. If she is coerced “into leading a life that is less 
good than she could have led without the intervention, then ... 
coercion will have harmed her highest order interest [in leading as 
good a life as possible]” (Kernohan, 1998:30), and such coercion the 
Harm principle forbids. 
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A “form of power which makes individual subjects”, where the word 
“subject” means “tied to her own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge”, need not harm the subject. In the sense of “power” at 
issue here, the making of the subject is the process by which 
ascripted identities are produced. The African-American phi-
losopher, Kwame Anthony Appiah, offers an account of the idea of 
ascripted identity. Appiah’s arguments are cast in terms of the 
formation of race identities, but what he has to say is relevant also 
for the shaping of religious identities of the kind Ludin projects. 
Identification is “the process through which an individual intentionally 
shapes her projects – including her plans for her own life and her 
conception of the good – by reference to available labels, available 
identities” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:78). Religious identities are such 
labels and they have a powerful grip on identity formation because 
they embrace normative expectations, for instance, of what being a 
woman in the Muslim world commits women to. And they have this 
force because identification is a process tied up with the self and its 
becoming a person. Identification is not voluntary in the sense that, 
say, males choose to be males, or females choose to be females, 
but being male or female shapes a person’s life plans in the sense 
that it is an ascribed identity males and females cannot escape. My 
identity is a matter of what I make up in an interactive context, from 
the “tool kit made available by our culture and society” (Appiah, 
1994:155). I cannot “make up any self I choose” (Appiah, 1994:155) 
because we are not free to reject all forms of ascribed identity.  
Escape from ascribed identities is almost impossible because of the 
way the process of identification works: It is in part based on 
“intentional identification” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:79), of acting 
“under descriptions” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:78) in Anscombe’s 
sense, i.e. in conformity to “the script for that identity” (Appiah & 
Gutman, 1998:79) and in conformity to having the “antecedent 
properties [male, female, black skin, white skin etc.] that are 
consequences of the label’s properly applying to ... [one]” (Appiah & 
Gutman, 1998:79), where the script and possessing the relevant 
properties “shape” one’s action (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:78). One 
acts, then, in “intentional conformity” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:79) to 
the expectations contained in the script, in conformity, that is, to 
what constitutes the proper way of being a Muslimin. There are 
many scripts, some very oppressive, written (mostly) by men for 
women, and some very liberatory, written (mostly) by women for 
women. 
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The experience of too tightly scripted expectations, of a claustro-
phobia brought on by the parameters of the script, is proof that there 
is a gap between what one ascriptively is or aspire to be and the 
(racial/religious) identity one performs. This gap “makes passing 
possible” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:79), i.e. in that space one is free 
to set aside one script in favour of another. Identification, then, is the 
process by which the label shapes the intentional acts of the agent 
(Appiah & Gutman, 1998:80), and though a choice between labels is 
possible, identification itself is not voluntary (Appiah & Gutman, 
1998:80). One chooses some label and one rejects others, and one 
may be fortunate enough to have a sense of “identity options” 
(Appiah & Gutman, 1998:80), a sense one acquires in a culture 
which encourages their growth.  
If Appiah is right, I make choices about my identity, but I do not 
determine the options among which I choose (Appiah, 1994:155). 
And among inescapable options there are, in Ludin’s world, religious 
identities which, given their constructed natures in non-secular 
societies, contain “scripts” (Appiah & Gutman, 1998:97) about what 
constitutes the proper way of being a man or a woman. Yet, though 
ascribed identities cannot be escaped, they can be deconstructed: “I 
can choose how central my identification with it will be – choose, 
that is, how much I will organize my life around that identity” (Appiah 
& Gutman, 1998:80 – Appiah’s emphasis). Thus a religious identity 
needs not be a centrally important feature in Ludin’s identity. A 
religious identity needs not be centrally urgent in her choice among 
her identity options in the way she supposes, or anyone else 
supposes, nor in any other way, except, of course, if Ludin freely 
chose (in the appropriate sense of “freely”) to make it thus. 
We argued above that the Kopftuch is not a neutral harm; it does not 
infringe the Harm principle in the required sense. The justification of 
its suppression would not be possible in terms of public reason 
because suppression itself infringes the values of dignity, equality 
and freedom. We are now in a position to make another point. Ludin 
has aquired an ascripted religious identity. The process by which 
this has happened is affected by the paternalism inherent in her 
culture, and this is true irrespective of the degree of voluntariness 
which attends her final choice. Is paternalism so very bad in her 
case? Arneson (1989:423, quoting Feinberg) defines weak pater-
nalism as restrictive of action “proceeding from choice that is 
substantially non-voluntary”, and as such does not count as violation 
of an agent’s autonomy. Strong paternalism affects the voluntary 
choices of individuals. Arneson (1989:429 quoting Feinberg) says, 
“A substantially non-voluntary choice ... is one that is not ’voluntary 
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enough’”, where being voluntary enough is a function of the degree 
that the choice falls short of perfect voluntariness”. A strong and a 
weak version may, following Van de Veer (1980:200), be dis-
tinguished. The claims are as follows: 
• Strong paternalism: The paternalistic state is justified in 
protecting a person, against her will, from the harmful 
consequences of her fully voluntary choices. 
• Weak paternalism: The paternalistic state is justified in pro-
tecting her from her non-voluntary choices. 
We present the case schematically. 
• A cultural milieu is needed for agents to acquire their identities 
(since it supplies both a context of choice and identity). 
• Public intervention shapes the cultural milieu in decisive ways. 
• Intervention prevents the expression in action of some choices. 
• Intervention therefore restricts freedom as choice. 
• Intervention is therefore paternalistic; some freely chosen 
conceptions of the good life cannot be realised. 
We need merely add another point to show the difference between 
the weak and the strong versions. 
• The fact that some choices cannot be expressed in action is a 
consequence of non-voluntary choice. Intervention is therefore 
paternalistic, but only on the weak reading of paternalism. 
Ludin’s unconscious subjugation to her cultural context is non-
voluntary, and so qualifies as weakly paternalistic. But her fully 
voluntary endorsement of the influences of her context as a good, 
and, indeed, her highest good, sheds a different light on the matter. 
The charge of strong paternalism thereby drops away and her 
religious identity becomes less a matter of ascription and more a 
matter of informed choice. We return to the issue of paternalism 
below. 
3.4 Generalising Meyerson’s distinction 
Based on our preliminary analysis, the controversy over the 
Kopftuch is seen as a conflict between conceptions of the good, the 
highest good of a particular individual, identified as a religious good, 
and a collective good, identified as a secular good prevalent in 
German culture – the equality between the sexes. Following 
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Meyerson (1994:58), we generalise the distinction between neutral 
and non-neutral harms over the whole of moral life, to include 
conceptions of a good life. This means that rival conceptions of what 
good entails must be recognised as causing intractable moral 
divisions in the private/social domain. It follows from the analysis 
above that conflict between conceptions of a good life are intractably 
disputed in exactly the way that religious beliefs are. It follows 
further that the state has no business arbitrating the relative merits 
of conceptions of the good life, because it cannot do so in neutral 
terms, that is, without taking sides, thereby causing neutral harm. 
And neutral harm means that at least one party suffers injustice.  
It has already been stated that religious identity “needs not” be 
centrally significant in Ludin’s life, but this strictly has no force when 
placed against her freely chosen options. What is at stake is Ludin’s 
freedom to choose, her right7 to decide what constitutes her own 
greatest good. Dworkin captures the appropriate idea of having a 
right: A right exists when there is a good moral reason for protecting 
some interest or good. Dworkin (quoted in Hartney, 1995:212) puts 
this line of thought as follows:  
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals 
have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not 
sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as 
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for 
imposing some loss or injury upon them. 
Is the alleged harm of gender inequality sufficient justification for the 
suppression of the Kopftuch? Our answer is implicit in what has 
gone before. The state and ordinary citizens have access to the 
moral belief about the wrongfulness of gender discrimination 
independently of their religious beliefs (a point we owe to Meyerson, 
1994:23). It is not necessary to suppress the Kopftuch, thereby 
damaging religious freedom, in order to protect this value. Christians 
may continue to believe in it; its alleged negation in the symbol of 
the Kopftuch does not deny them this freedom, and so they do not 
suffer a neutral harm (as distinct from offence). The collective goal in 
                                           
7 It is very important not to misconstrue our emphasis on “her right”. Following 
Meyerson (1994:46) the emphasis is not intended as a defence of subjectivism. 
The claim is not that “there is no right or wrong in religious matters” (Meyerson, 
1994:45-46). Rather, the claim is that “if there are truths about religious matters, 
they are not truths that can be publicly demonstrated (i.e. by the use of common 
standards of reason) (Meyerson, 1994:18). 
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question thus is not a sufficient justification for suppressing the 
Kopftuch and this means that Ludin’s right is unjustifiably denied.  
The allegation that the state is perceived to sanction funda-
mentalism, and specifically the suppression of women, whenever 
Ludin wears her Kopftuch in the classroom, is simply unfounded. 
There is no public reason to deny state representatives the freedom 
to bear religious symbols. And this means that the state’s stance of 
neutrality, in the sense outlined in the first position above, is not 
justified policy. Other senses of its neutrality are in order, particularly 
the sense in which the state maintains its position as servicer of 
rights in not taking sides when conceptions of the good are in 
conflict, but rather protecting the freedom to choose those con-
ceptions and to live in accordance with them. The second position 
above is simply sectarian. It is untenable without qualification. 
Ludin’s exclusion from the public realm is unjustified unequal 
treatment of a citizen. The association with the historical “metic”  
(cf. p. 278) is thereby unequivocally confirmed. Meyerson (1994:62) 
puts the matter very strongly:  
A society that respects everyone’s equal status is based on 
principles which all citizens can reasonably be expected to 
endorse. But reasonable people are not obliged to unite in 
endorsing one or other conception of the good. Therefore to permit 
the contractors to be mindful of their conception of the good – 
thereby allowing basic institutions to be tailored to serve the 
dominant conception of the good – would be to allow the 
distribution of fundamental rights and liberties to be determined by 
a factor inconsistent with the fact of everyone’s equal status. Basic 
institutions which respect the values of dignity, equality and 
freedom respond to intractable disagreements about the good life 
not by favouring one conception of the good over any other but by 
constituting a framework within which everyone has the same 
chance to define their own values and ends, provided that in the 
process they do not infringe on the similar chance of others. 
4. Why the Kopftuch fares so badly with Waldron 
4.1 Waldron and public reason 
Jeremy Waldron has objected to the Rawlsian notion of public 
reason on grounds that it suppresses the conversation between 
cultures in areas where conversation should continue. Waldron 
(2000:162) writes:  
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I think it is a serious mistake to approach the problem of 
intercultural deliberation first with the idea of deliberative discipline 
and the exclusion of certain lines of argument on the basis of some 
Rawlsian idea of public reason.  
Every effort has to be made to continue the conversation with others 
“on their own terms” as they attempt to converse with us “on ours” 
(Waldron, 2000:163 – Waldron’s emphasis), the point being to 
understand as much as possible about one another’s reasons. The 
discovery of reasons is the road to understanding social norms and 
practices; they exist “in a context of reasons and reasoning” 
(Waldron, 2000:170) inside “the story internal to the norm” (Waldron, 
2000:170).  
The identity politics so prevalent in multicultural societies, however, 
distort our understanding of the reasons. We hear too often that a 
reason for following a norm is that it is our norm: “It seems very odd 
to regard the fact that this is ‘our’ norm – that this is what we 
Irishmen or we French or we Maori do – as part of the reason, if not 
the central reason, for having the norm and for sustaining and 
following it” (Waldron, 2000:169), and not that we follow them 
because they lead to virtue, or happiness or justice or liberty. As 
soon as people start demanding respect for a norm associated with 
a culture “as part of the respect they demand for their identity” 
(Waldron, 2000:166), the conversation breaks down and the identity 
claims become an obstacle to their responsible participation in civic 
life (Waldron, 2000:168). 
Once we bracket the Rawlsian impulse for a deliberative discipline 
which excludes some norms or practices from the conversation, thus 
getting to their place “in a context of reasons and reasoning” 
(Waldron, 2000:170), and remove identity claims as potential non-
negotiable claims, we need not feel that we fail to respect someone 
when we criticise her norms, or fail to treat her practices as rights 
claims. We might then, as an alternative to identity politics, treat her 
norms as standards which have a point, which “does work” 
(Waldron, 2000:174) in her culture – work which “might, in principle 
or as a matter of at least logical possibility, have been performed by 
other norms, alternative standards, and which therefore cannot be 
understood except in terms of its association with an array of 
reasons explaining why it is in fact this norm rather than that norm 
… which is the standard we uphold” (Waldron, 2000:174 – 
Waldron’s emphasis). Then the stage is set for deliberation about 
the form legal and constitutional arrangements might take to 
accommodate our differences. 
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But there is an important rider: Waldron has no great faith in 
democratic majorities to settle rights claims fairly. He says: “On the 
whole real-world majorities have tended to act unjustly in the 
business” (Waldron, 2000:172. Waldron’s emphasis). On the other 
hand, not every rights claim is acceptable: “It simply cannot be the 
case that someone is wronged every time an opinion about rights is 
rejected in politics” (Waldron, 2000:166). Disagreements, according 
to Waldron (2000:166), must be handled with careful attention to a 
vital distinction “between the individual or minority interests which 
are the subject of the disagreement, and the opinions held by an 
individual or a minority about their interests”. It is this distinction 
which gets overlooked whenever an individual or a minority puts 
forward their rights claims as identity claims.  
4.2 Ludin’s identity claims 
We now have before us the business of trying to decide what is 
opinion and what is a real interest. First the identity claims should, 
however, be removed. On Waldron’s analysis Ludin could be read 
as making an identity claim, as saying: “I dress this way or I speak 
this language or I follow these marriage customs because they are 
the ways of my people” (Waldron, 2000:169). So out with the claim 
that the Kopftuch “sei Teil ihrer Glaubenspraxis als Muslimin”. This, 
though, needs qualification. Should the idea of a Glaubenspraxis 
also be rejected? We believe that not to be possible. We propose to 
retain it. Ludin can defend herself on the basis of Waldron’s 
alternative to identity politics provided only that her interlocutors do 
not defend their position as Christians or as Germans. If this be 
granted, the playing field is levelled, and the charge of gender 
inequality may be examined in its context of “reasons and 
reasoning”.  
There are, however, two other claims. “Das Kopftuch sei Teil ihrer 
Glaubenspraxis”, and, as reported by her lawyers, Ludin ex-
periences the removal of her Kopftuch as an act of undressing in 
public, as Entblößung, an occasion for shame – sich schämen. This 
means that the Kopftuch “sei Teil ihrer Persönlichkeit”. Are these 
claims matters of opinion or are they real interests? Ludin’s 
Glaubenspraxis is a real interest. That she suffers Entblösung 
without her Kopftuch can be read as an opinion (how undressed is 
undressed?), though not the fact that this brings on a condition of 
shame.  
The American philosopher, Robert Solomon (1995:825), declares 
that shame is an emotion serving as the focal point of ethics in many 
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non-Western philosophies. Shame is a social emotion, in contrast 
with guilt, which is an individualistic emotion. As a social emotion 
shame has to do with the violation of a common trust, the feel of 
which we capture by saying (in the appropriate context) “I have let 
the others down”. Shame is self-accusatory (like guilt), but it is so 
through the eyes of others, members of a congregation of faith and 
those outside the group, strangers. The experience of shame 
naturally extends to these others though their eyes do not project 
shame. The capacity to feel shame is a pre-condition of virtue. An 
Ethiopian proverb captures the appropriate sense: “Where there is 
no shame, there is no honour”. The very meaning of shame is proof 
that its experience is not a matter of opinion, or dependent on 
someone’s perspective. We hold that Entblößung and shame are 
inseparable. And shame is, in appropriate contexts involving 
Entblößung, a part of Ludin’s personality. The social context in 
which this connection is established is significant for our under-
standing of why the autonomy at issue in Ludin’s choice concerns 
moral choice. Is it tenable to require that this claim be bracketed?  
We have above arrived at the conclusion that the soft paternalism 
affecting Ludin’s case is not seriously incapacitating. Fundamental-
ism is less of a problem than what meets the eye. But in Waldron’s 
context we need to take this matter a step further simply because 
identity claims must be bracketed. 
4.3 Asian women and autonomy 
Is it reasonable to expect Ludin to bracket her moral beliefs, her 
personality and her status as woman? Waldron says: “The identity 
claims that are worrying us are not claims their proponents need to 
make in order to vindicate their cultural identities” (Waldron, 2000: 
168). And he adds, citing Hobbes’s fifth law of Nature, that “if one 
can do without the assertion of a rights claim or an identity claim that 
is going to pose a compossibility (see footnote 8) problem, then one 
has a duty to try and do without it” (Waldron, 2000:167). How does 
Ludin “do without it”? Might she unlearn one set of moral responses 
and the influence they have on her personality, and substitute 
another (presumably from her German context)? Or does she simply 
not put forward her beliefs as her’s? The former could be difficult. To 
show what is involved here we draw on ideas of Sawitri Saharso.  
Sawitri Sahorso (2000) explains why women from Asian cultures 
seldom attain the degree of autonomy which liberal theory in the 
West ascribes to Western women. Drawing on psychoanalytic 
understandings of the Asian self (Sahorso, 2000:231), she maintains 
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that women from Asian cultures do not develop the individuality and 
inclination for autonomy qua women that is needed to act against 
their cultural expectations. Citing Laplanche and Potalis (1973), she 
calls to attention how the idea of autonomy is captured in “the twin 
lemmas of ‘ego’ and ‘identification’” (Sahorso, 2000:233). The ego is 
the outcome of a process of identification, “ the process whereby the 
subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and 
is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. 
It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is 
constituted and specified” (Sahorso, 2000:233 quoting Laplanche & 
Potalis, 1973:205). The inclination to act autonomously is developed 
out of this process of identification as soon as the subject separates 
herself from her models and develops the ability to individuate. The 
outcome is a fully autonomous agent, defined by Sahorso (2000: 
233) as one who has “firm ego boundaries who experiences himself 
as a differentiated, but organized, unity, who exists independent of 
and differentiated from his environment”. 
But the universality of this process is disputed by Sudhir Kakar 
(1978), Katherine Ewing (1991), and Alan Roland (1996). The Asian 
personality is characterised “by more permeable ego boundaries 
that make for a more relational and less individualistic self” 
(Sahorso, 2000:233). This is so because in extended and close-knit 
families differentiation from parental models occurs later and is 
structurally weaker than in the West (Sahorso, 2000:233), and 
because family relations are characterised by intense ties of 
affection, mutual caring, reciprocity, and a “highly emphatic, non-
verbal sensitivity to one another’s feelings and needs without the 
other having to verbalize them” (Sahorso, 2000:234 quoting Roland, 
1996:32). Add to this hierarchically structured gender relations which 
make women unequal marriage partners, and it is not difficult to see 
that these cultural norms leave women in particular little recognised 
scope for autonomy. 
How little or how much scope should there be? Sahorso (2000:237) 
argues that the psychological dispositions created by internalised 
cultural norms, which render women less inclined to act auto-
nomously, can be modified. This is possible in a way that respects 
the highly valued relational qualities that are needed for close 
emotional interaction between family members, which renders a 
totally new enculturation process for minority groups unnecessary. 
The goal would be to create a cultural space for people who are not 
encouraged to have a conscious understanding of themselves as 
individuals (in the liberal Western sense) to develop (some) 
individuality (in that sense) (Sahorso, 2000:232). So here too there 
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is a way out, pace Appiah, of treating some ascribed/acquired 
identity as centrally significant, if the parameters are uncomfortable 
or disabling in the appropriate sense.  
However, women who have suffered this kind of paternalistic 
moulding have to be identified; we have to say that they, qua Asian 
women, have to receive certain kinds of treatment which will enable 
them to become participatory members of the public realm. Contra 
Waldron, an identity claim is needed to do justice to them. And this 
applies to Ludin as well. Ludin’s case is peculiar. She stands at the 
margins of society without the normal rights of access to the public 
realm, a position reminiscent of the guest workers in the states of 
the European Union, people Walzer (1983) calls “metics”. She is 
also a Muslimin and is believed to be suffering paternalistic sexual 
discrimination within her own culture. In her case there are two 
identity claims and each tells a story about an injustice. How do we 
do justice to Ludin without them?  
Sahorso, in effect, recommends a soft paternalistic modification of 
the cultural context to which members of minority groups are 
unconsciously subjugated. But the state, in keeping with liberal 
practice, refrained from paternalistic interference in the private/social 
domain. It seems that a hard choice was before the state: Either it 
places individual autonomy first, thereby sanctioning paternalistic 
interference (on the strong reading) in the cultural life of a minority in 
order to change it, i.e. liberalise its members to the extent that 
women are permitted to abandon the Kopftuch without fear of moral 
condemnation and ostracisation – thus demanding an exit option for 
the dissenting members of that group, in the way Green (1995:264) 
recommends – or it places the group’s autonomy first and does not 
interfere even when individual autonomy is curtailed within the 
group. The Catholic (Christlich-Soziale Union/Christlich Demo-
kratische Union) governed states opted for the latter, banishing the 
Kopftuch in public roles in keeping with their vision of what 
constitutes an infringement of the Harm principle, thereby making it 
difficult, and even impossible, for devout members of the Islamic 
minority to participate in civic affairs as equal participants. The 
Protestant (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) governed 
states opted for the former, in the belief that the stance of neutrality 
would bring about a soft paternalistic modification of Ludin’s cultural 
context, albeit coercively. Could the suggested modification of 
Ludin’s cultural context – which amounts to an intrusion in the 
private/social sphere – be the way forward? And if so, how is it 
morally justified?  
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We think it is clear enough that what is at stake in Ludin’s claim that 
the Kopftuch “sei Teil ihrer Persönlichkeit” is, contra Waldron, an 
interest and not merely an identity claim. As such it has a claim to be 
considered. Yet the conversation about the equal recognition of a 
cultural process by which individuals and their inclinations are 
shaped might run into difficulties of accommodation if the Islamic 
minorities reject the suggested modification of their practices and 
the demand for an exit option as unequal treatment. Waldron has 
doubts about the practicality of unmodified accommodation in the 
liberal state. He puts it like this:  
… may properly be demanded’, and ‘… can compossibly8 be 
accorded’ are independent constraints on liberal theories about the 
special treatment due to certain individual interests. We are not (as 
liberals) entitled to modify the former simply for the sake of the 
latter” (Waldron, 2000:159 – Waldron’s emphasis).  
Waldron (2000:162) further states that a system of mutual 
accommodations would be no solution at all if the disagreement is 
about what people are permitted to do. But this is at least part of 
what is here at issue. So how do we handle this claim? 
Compossibility is a problem. When faced with compossiblity 
problems the liberal had best follow Hobbes, opines Waldron 
(2000:167). Hobbes, in contrast with other liberal theorists, proceeds 
from the assumption that we are always likely to find ourselves 
“alongside others who disagree with us about justice” (Waldron, 
2000:171). From our side-by-side engagement with strangers we 
have to construct a framework for community. So, then, following 
Waldron and Hobbes, the state holds forward its ideal of gender 
equality, and simply that. And Ludin sticks with her Kopftuch as 
symbol of the virtuous women, and only that. Roots and identities 
stay out of the picture. 
In this trunctuated context there is nothing which prevents the state 
from using the weapons in its liberal armoury, of requiring a 
liberalising response from the Islamic minorities of the kind Sahorso 
recommends, as a condition of accommodation. This is at least 
possible given the state’s emphasis on the struggle for women’s 
equality – Gleichberechtigung (Editorial staff, 2003, quoting Rechts-
                                           
8 “‘Compossibility’ is a technical term, which originates, I believe, with Leibniz. 
The idea is that two things, each of which is possible, may not be compossible, 
i.e. possible together: the existence of one may preclude the existence of the 
other or even presuppose that the other does not exist” (Waldron, 2000:159). 
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professor Ferdinand Kirchhof, defining the first opposing position). 
Indeed, the stance of neutrality characteristic of the first opposing 
position requires that some liberalising response be made. Yet, if 
that is the demand the state is making, matching norm against norm 
(and just that), it sets itself the task of justifying to the minorities why 
their norm is unacceptable. It cannot be  unacceptable because it 
comes from a “provokanter, … fremder Kultur” (Kultusminister Hans 
Zehetmair [see Anon., 2003] defining the second opposing position), 
for it may reasonably be objected that this is tantamount to declaring 
a rival norm unworthy just because it is not home-grown i.e. un-
German. No, the unacceptability of the (alien) norm cannot be 
grounded in such an un-Waldronean way. Might it be unacceptable 
because it (supposedly) degrades women? Is the problem that the 
German (or European) norm (supposedly) defines the universal 
horizon for humanity, all others being less worthy of respect? Such 
questions may provoke a minority call for the constraints of public 
reason as a protection of their position as intrinsically worthy. It may 
also provoke a call for group-specific rights protecting minority 
religious practices in the way Kymlicka (1989) recommends.  
Waldron (2000:172) says:  
Some of what the majority may think is fair is revealed by … (his) 
analysis to be unfair – such as the a priori imposition of constraints 
of ‘public reason’. And much of what majorities are accused of 
doing unfairly – such as contradicting and debating minority 
practices – is revealed by … (his) analysis to be not after all 
inappropriate.  
Why does Waldron think that the majority has reason to invoke the 
constraints of public reason? And why would that be unfair? In 
Ludin’s case the state stands to lose by such a move for were it to 
invoke the discipline of public reason it has to move to protect 
Ludin’s religious conscience. Indeed, its right to intervene in the 
matter, in a role other than servicer of rights, falls away; then it will 
have no other lever besides its power to persuade the minority to a 
liberalising response. We think Waldron’s approach, matching norm 
against norm and just that, does not take the issue to a point of 
reasonable resolution, and that means that it leaves the question of 
accommodation where it was. 
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5. “Metic” – Musliminnen: The problem of the double-
bind 
5.1 Understanding one another’s reasons 
Another approach, also opposed to theories of deliberative 
discipline, advanced by Melissa Williams, advocates sensitivity to 
other’s reasons as reasons. This approach is extremely sensitive to 
the peculiarities of people, their situations and status. It offers a 
different solution to the problem than Meyerson’s approach.  
Williams (2000:125) claims that the theory of deliberative democracy 
does not adequately address the problems of how structural biases 
in deliberative processes disadvantage minority groups. Williams 
(2000:134) argues for a position midway between Meyerson and 
Waldron. She says:  
Models of deliberative democracy call upon participants to speak 
in their capacity as citizens, articulating their arguments in terms of 
shared or general interests, rather than as bearers of particular 
identities and interests. Yet it is only by focussing on the divergent 
interests of privileged and marginalized groups that the latter’s 
contribution to deliberation can contribute to the end of justice 
towards those groups.  
Social difference, defined along the lines of race, gender, class, 
sexuality, ethnicity and other categories of difference, tends to 
undermine the notions of reasonableness and reason-giving upon 
which the legitimacy of state policies like neutrality rest, the central 
problem being a failure of legitimacy which is due to the failure to 
recognise the minority’s reasons as reasons. Such recognition, 
when offered, usually turns out to be a socioculturally contingent 
matter. Williams (2000:137) cites as example the debate in the U.S. 
Senate on a design patent on the emblem of the Daughters of the 
Confederacy which included an image of the Confederate flag. The 
patent was initially approved by a wide margin, but after a long and 
serious debate, initiated by the African-American Senator Carol 
Mosley-Braun, who pointed out the close association between the 
history of slavery and the Confederate flag, the patent was rejected 
by a wide margin. The Senator is cited as saying that the patent was 
“an outrage. It is an insult. It is absolutely unacceptable to me and to 
millions of Americans, black and white, that we would put the 
imprimatur of the United states Senate on a symbol of this kind of 
idea” (Mosley-Braun quoted in Williams, 2000:137). 
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Contra Waldron, roots and identity matter in public debate. 
Translated to Ludin this means that the unacceptability of reasons 
must be qualified by asking “for whom?”, or “Who is speaking?” The 
Kopftuch is a vicious symbol for most Christian Germans; it is a 
symbol of virtue for most German Musliminnen. How do we 
disentangle virtue and vice in one and the same symbol? Williams 
(2000:138) argues that the dispute over the Confederate flag 
revolves around the “social meanings” of the symbol. For black 
Americans the Confederate flag is an emblem of slavery. For white 
Americans from the south the flag is a remembrance of sacrifices 
made for their homeland. Why should the social meaning of the flag 
to black Americans count as a reason for white Southerners when 
they do not endorse the content of that meaning? Does Mosley-
Braun’s interpretation of the meaning of the Confederate flag 
constitute a reasonable or unreasonable source of disagreement? 
And how does Ludin fare when we apply this question mutatis 
mutandis to her?  
Williams (2000:138) thinks that the status of reasons as reasons 
becomes particularly problematic when the subject of disagreement 
concerns the social meanings of existing practices which reinforce 
current unjust structures of social privilege. For in such circum-
stances the reasons of marginalised groups do not function as 
reasons for privileged groups. In Germany the minority Turkish and 
other ethnic groups from the Muslim world are still associated with 
the idea of “guest workers” in Walzer’s (1983) sense – “metics”, 
immigrants without the rights of citizenship, though like Ludin many 
have attained that status. Kymlicka and Norman (2000:21), 
remarking on Walzer, describes the plight of “metics” as follows:  
They face enormous obstacles to integration – legal, political, 
economic, social, and psychological – and so tend to exist at the 
margins of the larger society. Where such marginalized com-
munities exist, the danger arises of the creation of a permanently 
disenfranchised, alienated, and racially defined underclass.  
This somewhat negative picture of how welcome immigrants and 
guest workers are in Germany is emphasised by Francis Nyamnjoh 
(2003:8) from the University of Botswana. “It doesn’t matter if you’ve 
read Goethe, wear Lederhosen, and do a Bavarian dance, they’ll still 
treat you as an immigrant.” 
If Walzer is right, a common life exists only if people share in 
shaping that life. If values are not (fully) shared, or are imposed by 
domination, then a common life is not possible. According to 
Downing and Thigpen (1986:457), Walzer argues “that a common 
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life may deserve more or less respect and that the appropriate 
degree of respect should be determined by inquiry into the origin of 
social meanings” (our emphasis). For a genuine common life to 
exist, members of a community must share in creating the social 
meanings. The communality of a given social order depends on its 
inclusiveness. Membership is for Walzer the first condition of 
participation in the creation of the commonality, and it must therefore 
be distributed equally. Downing and Thigpen (1986:417) formulate 
the critical edge that this gives to social criticism as follows: 
The concept of the common life ... becomes a standard when a 
criterion justifying respect for shared understandings is introduced. 
This standard of judgement can be applied ... by citizens who have 
assumed that they share a common life. Their discovery of forms 
of domination that exclude them from the common life should lead 
them (without resort to an external vantage point) to criticize their 
society9.  
The problem seems to be that the countries of the European Union 
are really concerned with protecting themselves from migrants 
rather than with the protection of those groups (Nyamnjoh, 2003:8 
citing Thomas & Lee, 1998). Privileged groups, says Williams (2000: 
139), are motivated to withhold recognition of the Other’s reasons to 
protect their own entrenched interests. The protection of entrenched 
interests in circumstances of unequal power means that minority 
interests are likely to be discounted. Discounting is a problem, a sign 
of unequal treatment. When reasons are discounted they are given 
less weight in deliberation than what their proponents give them. 
Mosley-Braun faced this problem at the first round of the vote. There 
was little to prevent the U.S. Senate from responding to her in the 
way that the Plessy court responded to arguments concerning the 
stigma of segregation in the U.S.A.  
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to 
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation between 
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If 
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it (Williams, 2000:139 quoting Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) – Williams’s emphasis). 
                                           
9 Walzer’s arguments apply properly only to the USA, but Downing and Thigpen 
have argued that in so far as Walzer’s (1983) arguments rely on comprehensive 
theory, some of the basics of his case in the USA apply also elsewhere. In this 
we follow Downing and Thigpen (1986). 
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Yet the Senate granted Mosley-Braun her standing at the second 
vote. And that means that the association of the Confederate flag 
with the history of slavery was confirmed as a possible inter-
pretation, and a rival to the interpretation initially favoured. Mosley-
Braun’s interpretation of the symbol, offered on behalf of African-
Americans, was then not an unreasonable source of disagreement. 
There is surely more to the Confederate flag than its association 
with the history of slavery, as there is more to the Kopftuch than its 
association with the history of the suppression of women. This 
“more” is evidence that rival interpretations of the meanings of the 
symbols at issue do not in themselves constitute unreasonable 
sources of disagreement.  
5.2 Feminism, womanism and the double-bind 
We take it , then, that it is not unreasonable to interpret the Kopftuch 
as a symbol of virtue. This interpretation, though, is hardly visible in 
public life. The state’s demand that neutrality be maintained does 
not help to communicate the interpretation which the Muslim 
minorities endorse. What, then, should we make of the stance of 
neutrality? In the Catholic states the neutrality requirement is not 
seriously enforced. The crucifix is permitted in the classroom and 
must be taken down only when a protest is registered. But this still is 
selective permission of religious symbols. Muslim symbols are 
explicitly forbidden. Knapp (2003: 28-29), in summing up a response 
from Bavaria’s Kultusministerin, Monika Hohlmeier (Christlich-
Soziale Union), said the following:  
The reasons for this differentiation, or more precisely unequal 
treatment, she has already given. The Christian churches endorse 
the principle of the equality of the sexes as enshrined in the 
constitution. The Islamic faith does not. However, it is at least still 
arguable whether the Catholic church does in fact unqualifiedly 
accepts the idea of equality between men and women.10 
In the Protestant states the neutrality requirement is taken seriously, 
and here it seems like a very reasonable solution to the problem of 
rival symbols of loyalty within the same state. But the reason-
ableness of this solution soon evaporates as soon as we realise that 
                                           
10 “Eine Begründung für diese Differenzierung, genauer gesagt Ungleich-
behandlung, hat sie bereits gegeben. Die christlichen Kirchen anerkennen ihrer 
Ansicht nach vorbehaltlos das Grundgesetz. Für den Islam gelte das nicht, 
jedenfalls nicht insgesamt. Nun könnte man trefflich darüber streiten, ob die 
katholische Kirche tatsächlich die Gleichberechtigung von Männern und Frauen 
vorbehaltlos akzeptiert.” 
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banning the Kopftuch and the crucifix from the public arena changes 
nothing in the secular state where the strict separation of state and 
church disallows the crucifix anyway. The state demands that a 
signifier of difference first be removed before talks can begin. But 
once removed, neutrality for public agents in the required sense is 
asserted. The reason for dialogue is thereby obviated. Nothing is 
granted yet the case is lost. 
As we judge it the state’s stance of neutrality is actually a form of 
“status quo neutrality” (a phrase we borrow from Williams, 
2000:141), found generally throughout the states of the European 
Union, particularly in states which have a large percentage of 
Muslim religionists, e.g. France. “Status quo neutrality” just is what 
the words suggest, an attempt to deal with  restless minorities with-
out actually granting their demands. Williams (2000:142), quoting 
Sunstein (1993:3), argues that the liberal state “defines neutrality by 
taking, as a given and as the baseline for decision, the status quo, 
or what various people and groups now have … A departure from 
the status quo signals partisanship; respect for the status quo 
signals neutrality”.  
To the extent that the state marginalises the Muslim minority, i.e. 
treats them as the historical “metics” – it fails to live up to its liberal 
constitution. Status quo neutrality is the symptom of this malady. 
The state’s demand for a liberalising response from the minorities as 
a precondition of dialogue is in conflict with its professed liberalism. 
In effect, the state demands a winning hand before the game 
begins! Just how seriously do we treat the state’s demand for a 
liberalising response when it itself oversteps the boundaries of 
cultural-religious (or is it ethno-religious?) equality? 
The Harm principle, of course, hangs closely together with the 
stance of neutrality. Unequal treatment is a harm, a setback to 
someone’s interests. Status quo neutrality is a harm to Musliminnen. 
Is this harm – in the appropriate sense in which the social pressures 
generated by state-generated pressure to remove the Kopftuch is a 
harm – comparable to the harm women suffer and have suffered 
historically in circumstances of unequal power? It follows from our 
argument in Section 3 that the coercive constraints of the stance of 
neutrality infringes the Harm principle and issues in a neutral harm – 
the marginalisation of religious minorities. The state is not entitled to 
inflict harms of this kind on its citizens. The state claims that the 
harm women have suffered as a consequence of sexual dis-
crimination is the harm Musliminnen suffer and have suffered as 
long as they refuse Entblößung. Let us grant the state’s claim. We 
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then ask whether this alleged suffering is comparable to the 
suffering of the historical “metics”? This is a reasonable question 
considering that to refuse Entblößung is to be reduced to the status 
of the “metic” (as Ludin’s present status demonstrates). Now, we 
maintain that the suffering of Musliminnen as “metics” is an 
additional burden for German Musliminnen. They shoulder a double 
load; they suffer as women in unequal partnerships with men, and 
they suffer as “metics”, as strangers in a country that bids them “Not 
welcome!”  
For liberals Ludin’s status as religious dissenter is less significant 
than the denial of her status as full and equal member of the 
democracy of which she is a citizen. As we judge, the stigma of the 
“metic” colours her religious dissent and blocks resolution of the 
latter solely as a question of religious freedom. How these two 
things hang together – cultural imperialism (“metic”) and sexual 
imperialism (Muslimin) – is the true meaning of the state’s claim that 
Ludin’s Kopftuch is a symbol of political dissent masquerading as 
religious dissent.  
If this is political dissent, we must ask to what extent the 
interpretation of the Kopftuch as a vicious symbol of the suppression 
of women throughout history is a construction imposed on Ludin in 
circumstances coloured by the stigma of the “metic”? We must also 
ask whether that is the reason why her reason fails to count as a 
reason? Let us put the argument of the previous section on its head 
and ask whether the Kopftuch as a symbol of the religiously virtuous 
woman reads as a construction for Christian women in Germany in 
their circumstances of legal equality with men? Do German women 
see the religiosity of the symbol? Do they see its stigmatic 
association with the historical “metic”? Do they see the moral 
content? Or do they see only their long struggle for liberation? And 
then rush to liberate Ludin? Should Ludin be liberated from the 
Kopftuch, or simply from the stigma of the “metic”? And if we liberate 
her from the latter, would the Kopftuch then be acceptable?  
For Ludin the double-bind, “metic” – and – Muslimin, is the critical 
factor. The status of “metic” seems most often to be only a cultural-
religious category. But at times it seems also to be an ethnic, i.e. a 
racial category. Does race play a role here? In a recent publication, 
Race in 21st Century America, Hu-Dehart (2001:83) argues that in 
nineteenth-century America non-whites (including Chinese and 
native Americans) were “usually subsumed under the black 
category”. The understanding of race beyond the simple black-white 
divide, by which all non-European (read “non-white”) people are 
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included under the black category, has a long history. In con-
temporary America race discourse follows the same logic; 
“blackness” serves as the extreme of all non-Europeans (i.e. non-
whites). If this is a live category in Germany, the “metic” is also a 
racial category.  
Do German women know that overcoming the barrier that separates 
women from women entails confronting the reality of both cultural 
(as place-holder for racial?) and sexual imperialism? Does cultural 
(racial?) imperialism overshadow bonding between German women 
on the basis of sex? Do German women preferentially bond with 
German men against the Other? If so, “metic” is a category of 
blackness. If so, German women and men maintain only a white 
egalitarianism and not a non-racial one. It follows that Ludin is not 
protected by white-on-white moral constraints, and that she can be 
denied rights without moral guilt. Out of this no-one can build a 
multicultural state. 
To white feminists in Germany Ludin is an anachronistic rarity. Katja 
Husen (2003), feminist parliamentarian (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 
describes Ludin as one enjoying the freedoms and rights of the 
liberal state, yet she clings to her Kopftuch, the very thing that 
makes her invisible in traditional Islamic society, i.e. denies her the 
rights and freedoms just referred to in Islamic society:  
Women like Fereshta Ludin, who in spite of the headdress still 
have and enjoy all these rights (choice of a career, and 
unobstructed access to the public domain) are universally the 
absolute exception, not the rule.11  
The additions in parenthesis are Husen’s words. Ludin is not visible 
in the public domain. She does not have unobstructed access to this 
realm, nor does she have the free choice of a career. Ludin’s 
invisibility is in Jeremy Weate’s sense, a “construction of the inner 
eyes” (Weate, 2003:12 quoting from Ellison’s Invisible man) of those 
(like Husen) who refuse to see her. Within the framework of feminist 
normativity Ludin is socially invisible, i.e. she is “being seen as 
invisible” (Weate, 2003:14 quoting from Ellison’s Invisible man). 
Husen refuses to see the “metic”. Verily, we say unto you: Ludin is 
the woman the feminist does not see!  
                                           
11 “Frauen wie Fereshta Ludin, die trotz Kopftuch all diese Rechte haben und 
nutzen [unter andere, ‘freie Berufswahl’, und ‘ungehinderten Zugang des 
öffentlichen Raumes’], sind international die absolute Ausnahme – nicht die 
Regel”. 
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Is status-quo feminism at all helpful? Marie Pauline Eboh (1998: 
335), speaking from an African perspective relevant to Ludin’s 
problem, defines the African women’s rejection of feminism in the 
white world in favour of “womanism” in the black world as follows:  
African womanism tends to marry African perturbation with the 
feminine problem. For the African womanist, the double allegiance 
to women’s emancipation and African liberation are inseparable. 
This is the philosophy of African womanism.  
The African-American, bell hooks12, offers some guidance from the 
USA. hooks (1998:340) claims that privileged white women in the 
USA organise around their own oppression, thus ignoring the 
differences between their social status and the status of black 
women who experience racial discrimination in addition to sexual 
discrimination. White feminism, therefore, is only the mark of race 
and class privilege, an image black women cannot identify with 
because for them there is nothing liberatory in the white-party line 
analyses of women’s oppression. hooks (1998:343) describes her 
experiences at the hands of feminists as follows:  
Our presence in movement activities did not count, as white 
women were convinced that ‘real’ blackness meant speaking the 
patois of poor black people, being uneducated, streetwise, and a 
variety of other stereotypes. If we dared to criticise the movement 
or to assume responsibility for reshaping feminists’ ideas and 
introducing new ideas, our voices were tuned out, dismissed, 
silenced. We could be heard only if our statements echoed the 
sentiments of the dominant discourse.    
German feminists see the Kopftuch as a threat to the status quo 
because it figures too powerfully in Ludin’s assertive assault on the 
entire fabric of inequality in the public realm. Their hostility is one of 
the unintended consequences of Ludin’s plea for religious tolerance. 
For German men such a powerfully assertive woman is likewise 
invisible as woman, assertiveness and power being qualities too 
masculine for a woman. As punishment Ludin has earned herself 
the image of political dissenter Number One – the Number One 
“Other”. Her “controlling image” (Collins, 1998:346) is the “metic”-
Muslimin, comparable to the negative images black women have 
and have had in America – “mammies, matriarchs, welfare re-
cipients, and hot mommas” (Collins, 1998:346). In Patricia Collins’s 
words (Collins, 1998:346-347), Ludin is frozen in a condition of 
                                           
12 This orthography (with small letters) is the preference of bell hooks. 
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inbetweenness; she is essential for the survival of society simply 
“because those individuals who stand at the margin of society clarify 
its boundaries” though they do not belong. By not belonging she 
“emphasises the significance of belonging”. 
6. The failure of integration 
Ludin (2003:30) says: “For me it is interesting to note – particularly 
in the social discussion which occurred after the judgement (of the 
German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe) – who actually makes of 
the theme a political one, and which basic political changes in our 
society will be achieved by the discussion”.13 
As we judge there are two consequences of political importance. 
The first deals with the unwillingness of the German states (and for 
that matter the rest of the world) to cope with the pressures of 
multiculturalism. There are two kinds of multiculturalism on the 
international market at present, a “thick” and a “thin” variety. The 
South African philosopher W.C van der Merwe (1999:316) dis-
tinguishes these as follows:  
With thin multiculturalism is meant societies in which the cultural 
differences which are claimed as rights are embedded in a greater 
(political) culture, a liberal democratic culture or a culture of 
universal human rights in which consensus exists about the right to 
differences as, for example, has been the case in Belgium until 
recently. Thick multicultural societies refer to societies, like Israel, 
wherein certain of the cultural differences which are claimed as 
rights, undermine a general acknowledgement of the right to 
difference, for example, when what is demanded is the right to a 
nondemocratic political system, or the prohibition of religious free-
dom, freedom of speech and so forth.  
At present the German states which banned Muslim symbols while 
keeping Christian ones are behaving like Van der Merwe’s thick 
multicultural societies. The second opposing position is their stance; 
it is the position of Catholic conservatism in Germany prevalent in 
the Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union 
(libertarian capitalists) governed states. Their stance is strongly 
sectarian. They are undermining the “general acknowledgement of 
the right to difference”, and out of that no-one can build a multi-
                                           
13 “Für  mich bleibt es interessant zu beobachten – vor allem in der  nach  dem  
Urteil entstandenen gesellschaftlichen Diskussion – wer hier das Thema 
eigentlich zu einem Politikum macht und welche grundsätzlichen politischen 
Veränderungen in unser Gesellschaft damit erreicht werden sollen”. 
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cultural society. The stance of neutrality, the first opposing position, 
is the stance of the Protestant Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (social democrats) governed states. They behave more like 
the thin version. But even here there is not much evidence that 
cultural differences which are claimed as rights are embedded in the 
greater (political) culture, as Van der Merwe describes this position. 
These states do not consistently present a liberal face, so the 
neutrality issue can hardly be interpreted as one of the liberal state 
demanding a liberalising response from an illiberal minority.14 
Though they exhibit more tolerance than the Catholics, they also fail 
the liberal test of tolerance. We have chosen to chastise these 
states for their illiberalism, but that does not mean that Ludin’s 
intolerant, paternalistic co-religionists are let off the hook. Their 
support of gender inequality is an abomination. In defending the 
Kopftuch we have not defended their intolerance.  
There is an important reason why tolerance figures so poorly in 
Germany generally. Liberal pluralism is here still in a somewhat 
primitive form. German liberal pluralism assumes only European 
values and working conditions, and so tends to screen out the 
diversity of cultural viewpoints in the public realm, allowing only the 
voices of the dominant culture to be heard. Given this fact we judge 
state neutrality with respect to political morality to be wrong headed. 
The state should intervene when values sacrosanct to liberal 
pluralism are under threat – values like autonomy, equality and 
tolerance. The relative tolerance of the Protestant states is dis-
appointing considering the long struggle for Protestant recognition in 
Germany. There is nothing like suffering for one human to recognise 
the humanity of another. Husen should note this fact. And so should 
Verfassungsrichterin Lübbe-Wolff 15 who stood before Ludin in the 
court – woman to woman – to hand down judgement.  
The second consequence of political importance deals with the 
freedom citizens have to operate freely as equal participants in the 
public realm. We have argued above that with respect to this 
freedom Ludin has suffered denial of a right fundamental to 
democracy. The direct implication of Meyerson’s protection of the 
                                           
14 Subject-related literature presents extended philosophical thought about how a 
liberal state should deal with an illiberal minority. See Will Kymlicka, 1989, 1995 
and Andrew Kernohan, 1998. 
15 The photograph of Ludin standing before Verfassungsrichterin Lübbe-Wolff 
earned third prize in a national photographic competition (Anon., 2004). 
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Kopftuch in the private/social realm under Rawls’s shield (see John 
Rawls, 1971), is that it must also be protected in the public/political 
realm, for the values protected in the former must find expression 
and confirmation in the latter if they are to be recognised as values 
of a multicultural commonwealth. Only then can the process of 
multicultural integration in the public realm begin.  
Yet the state denies that Ludin has been denied access to the 
public/political domain. This claim has been defended by parties 
sympathetic to the state: “Mrs. Ludin’s freedom of religion has not 
been affected in the public realm, in fact, she can even teach at 
private schools” (Müller, 2003c, quoting Rechtsprofessor Ferdinand 
Kirchhof).16 She can, but that is not the point. Private schools for 
Muslim children are privately funded. Muslim communities have to 
pay for the continuity and survival of their cultural context, something 
the German communities get for free. This point about paying for 
what others get for free is itself evidence of unequal treatment in the 
public domain (a point we owe to Kymlicka, 1989). It hangs together 
with the point about being visible as a participating community in the 
public realm. German liberal pluralism favours German (ethnic) 
interests, which fact renders other voices inaudible in public life. The 
Muslim communities therefore have a more difficult task to make 
their voices heard in the public domain. The state’s denial that Ludin 
has been disadvantaged underscores its sensitivity to the point that 
the confirmation of values at the level of the public/political realm is 
essential to integration. It is clear that thus far the state’s integration 
policies have failed. Something like Meyerson’s approach, or 
Williams’s, is needed to do justice to Ludin and Muslim minorities.  
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